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ABSTRACT.  
One channel through which environment is damaged is consumption. To 
protect environment, various product standards are introduced all over the 
world. By using a new economic geography framework, this paper 
explores the effects of environmental product standards on environment in 
a North-South trade model. We examine a situation in which North 
unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, 
those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in 
the North market. We find that such a standard may worsen North 
environment but improve South environment through firm relocation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Concern for environmental destruction has been growing in the world. To 
protect environment, various environmental policies are adopted all over the world. 
However, attitudes towards environmental destruction are different across countries. 
Thus, some countries adopt more stringent policies than others. Examples include 
environmental “product” standards such as auto emission standards. In particular, it is 
often observed that governments prohibit firms from selling those products that do not 
meet certain environmental product standards. For example, under the U.S. Clean Air 
Act of 1970 called the Muskie Act, automakers were not allowed to sell cars that do 
not meet the emission standards.
1 The EU prohibited the use of chrysotile asbestos 
products and banned their imports from Canada in 1998. In 2002, China introduced 
the China Compulsory Certification, under which foreign firms cannot export to 
China without implementing certain standards. 
Environmental policies could affect firm locations. It is expected that firms 
tend to move to countries with lax environmental policies.
2 In particular, recent 
improvements in transportation and communications technology as well as trade 
liberalization allow firms to choose their locations more easily. Above-mentioned 
prohibitive environmental product standards may also affect firm locations. Firms no 
longer may have much incentive to locate in the country with prohibitive standards. 
An important point is that firm relocations caused by environmental product standards 
could affect environment.  
In this paper, therefore, we theoretically analyze the effects of prohibitive 
environmental product standards on firm locations and environment. To this end, we 
adopt a new economic geography (NEG) framework, because firm locations are the 
central issue in the NEG literature. Because of its simplicity, we specifically employ 
the so-called footloose capital model developed by Martin and Rogers (1995).
3 In the 
                                                 
1 Since the standards were overly strict, it was expected that no auto producer could achieve the 
standards. The target dates were extended a total of three years and the law was subsequently revised as 
the Clean Air Act of 1977. 
2 Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), Greenstone (2002), and List et al. (2003) find that 
pollution-intensive plants are responding to environmental regulations. 
3 The footloose capital model is the simplest model in NEG. See Baldwin et al. (2003).   3
model, there are two countries (North and South), two sectors (agriculture and 
manufacturing), and two factors (capital and labor). The agricultural product, which 
perfectly competitive firms produce from labor alone with constant-returns-scale 
(CRS) technology, is freely traded internationally. The manufactured products are 
subject to the Dixit–Stiglitz (1977) type of monopolistic competition, are costly to 
ship internationally, and damage local environment in the process of consumption. 
Capital is mobile across countries and determines firm location, though capital owners 
and labor are not mobile.  
North is more concerned about environment and unilaterally introduces an 
environmental product standard. If firms do not comply with it, they cannot serve the 
North market. In the presence of the possibility of firm relocation, therefore, those 
firms producing goods that do not meet the North standard operate in South and serve 
only South market. Those firms that conform to the North standard by incurring extra 
costs can serve both North and South markets and locate in either North or South.  
Our main finding is that North environmental product standards may fail to 
protect North environment. With the standard, those products that do not meet the 
standard (henceforth, dirty products) are excluded from consumption in North, but 
consumption of the other products, i.e., products satisfying the standard (henceforth, 
clean products) could increase. Unless clean products never damage environment, 
North environment could deteriorate as a result. Moreover, South environment may 
be improved by North environmental product standards. We show such paradoxical 
effects of North environmental product standards in the presence of firm relocation.  
There are many studies that theoretically investigate the relationship between 
environmental policies and firm locations (see Markusen et al. 1993, 1995 and 
Rauscher, 1995, among others). However, the existing literature mostly deals with 
“production” externalities in a monopoly or oligopoly model. We should mention that 
environmental product standards are applied when “consumption” generates negative 
externalities.   4
Relatively little attention has been paid to environmental and trade policies 
with consumption externalities. In particular, only few studies analyze environmental 
product standards in the open economy framework. In an international duopoly model, 
Fischer and Serra (2000) consider optimal minimum standards and examine whether 
they are protectionist. Haupt (2000) examines the relationship between environmental 
product standards and environmental R&D in a monopolistically competitive sector in 
a two-country model. On the basis of a model with environmentally differentiated 
products and heterogeneous consumers, Toshimitsu (2008) shows that a strict 
emission standard on an imported product may or may not increase social surplus. 
Ishikawa and Okubo (2009) also show that prohibitive environmental standards may 
worsen environment. However, they use an international duopoly model in which 
environmental deterioration is caused by R&D or licensing. 
There are only a few NEG studies that examine environmental policies. 
Pfluger (2001) considers Pigouvian emission taxes in an NEG model. Venables 
(1999) studies the impact of energy taxes on equilibrium in a vertical linkage model. 
Elbers and Withagen (2004) explore the impact of an emission tax on agglomeration 
in the presence of labor migration. By using the footloose capital model, Zeng and 
Zhao (2009) examine pollution haven in the presence of both cross-border and cross-
sector externalities. Ishikawa and Okubo (2008) also use the footloose capital model 
to compare between emission tax and quota policies when controlling greenhouse-gas 
emissions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our 
basic model and analyze the initial equilibrium. As an example of environmental 
product standard, we consider emission standards such as auto exhaust emission 
regulations. In Section 3, the equilibrium under emission standards is explored. In the 
presence of standards, some firms incur costs to conform to them, but the others do 
not. This leads to firm relocation. In Section 4, some extensions are investigated. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
   5
2. NORTH-SOUTH TRADE MODEL 
2.1.  Basic model with wage gap and factor mobility 
We employ the Dixit-Stigliz type of monopolistic competition model with 
international capital mobility (firm migration) developed by Martin and Rogers 
(1995). There are two countries (North and South), two production factors (labor, L, 
and physical capital, K) and two sectors (agriculture, A-sector, and manufacturing, M-
sector). Labor is mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. Capital is 
mobile across countries, though capital owners are not. 
We incorporate the following two features into Martin and Rogers (1995): 1) 
negative externalities are caused by emissions when M-sector products are consumed, 
and 2) an international wage gap exists. North is bigger than South in population size 
but the North (nominal) wage rate is higher than the South wage rate.
5  
The agricultural product is produced from labor alone by perfectly competitive 
firms under CRS technology and is traded without any trade cost. This product serves 
as a numéraire. To produce one unit of the agricultural product, North and South, 
respectively, require 1/w units of labor and 1/w
* units of labor. “*” indicates variables 
and parameters in South. We assume that the wage rate in North is higher than that in 
South. By setting 1/w=1 (that is, the North wage rate equal to unity), the South wage 
rate, w
*, satisfies w
* <1. 
The manufactured goods are subject to the Dixit–Stiglitz type of monopolistic 
competition and are traded with trade costs. Firms in M-sector in Martin and Rogers 
(1995) can move between countries, but there is no entry and exit. M-sector uses labor 
and exclusively employs capital. Specifically, each firm is required to use one unit of 
capital, which represents fixed costs, and “a” units of labor per output. The cost 
function for firm j is given by  j j j awx TC + =π , where π, i.e., the fixed cost part of 
total cost, represents the payment for capital and w is the wage rate. Trade costs, τ(> 
1), are the iceberg type, where τ = 1 and τ = ∞respectively, mean free trade and 
autarky. 
                                                 
5 Lower South wage rates attract firms to South. Unless North is bigger than South, all firms could 
locate in South (without any environmental policy), because of cost advantage in South but no demand 
advantage in North (no agglomeration force).   6
Turning to the demand side, a representative consumer (in North) has the 
following quasi-linear utility function: 
(1)  ( ) 1 , 0 1 , ), ( ln
) /( 1 / 1 1 * / 1 1 > > > + ≡ − + =
− − σ µ χ µ
σ σ σ 1/ - 1
S c n nc   M g A M U , 
where M and A stand for consumption of M-sector varieties and that of A-sector, 
respectively, and µ is the intensity of preference towards M-sector goods. n is the 
number of differentiated varieties. c is the quantity of North consumption of each 
variety produced in North, while  S c  is that produced in South.
6 Mirror image holds 
for South. σ in the CES function for differentiated varieties denotes the constant 
elasticity of substitution between two varieties.  
The disutility caused by local emissions is expressed as an increasingly 
monotonic function of the total emissions of M-sector varieties, g(χ ), where χ  is the 
total emissions in North ( * χ  is for South).
7 By an appropriate choice of units, one 
unit of consumption of M-sector varieties generates one unit of emissions, that is, 
S c n nc
* + ≡ χ . Following Fischer and Serra (2000), we assume that the representative 
consumer ignores the negative externalities when making the consumption decisions.
8  
Each consumer has one unit of capital as well as one unit of labor and obtains 
income from both factors. It should be noted that the quasi-linear function eliminates 
the income effect and hence each consumer buys a certain number of units of M-
goods regardless of his/her income. 
While capital is mobile between two countries, capital owners are immobile 
and hence capital rewards are repatriated to the country of origin. Because capital 
endowment is initially allocated in proportion to labor endowment (market size), 
                                                 
6 Since  S c  is the quantity of “North” consumption of a variety produced in South, “*” is not attached. 
A subscript “S” indicates the production location. 
* c  is the quantity of “South” consumption of a 
variety produced in North and 
*
S c  is the quantity of “South” consumption of a variety produced in 
South. 
7 The case in which the disutility is caused by “global” emissions is dealt with in Section 4.1. 
8 There is another modelling in which consumers care about environmental damage when making the 
consumption decisions. For example, in Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002), consumers 
differ in their willingness-to-pay for goods due to different environmental awareness.   7
North’s share of initial capital and labor endowments are given by 
W
K K K s / ≡  = 
L
W s L L ≡ / , where “W” stands for values pertaining to the world. However, after firm 
relocation, capital share is generally not equal to population share. Whereas 
population share always corresponds to the labor share, sL, the capital share is always 
identical to the firm share, 
W n n/  = sK. This is because each internationally mobile 
firm needs one unit of capital.  
Because no income effect exists, the quasi-linear utility function ensures s ≡sE 
= sL where the share of North expenditure, E, is defined as  ≡ E s
W E E / , which equals 
population share but is independent of the wage gap. Since North is larger than South, 
sE is greater than 0.5. For simplicity, the total expenditure 
W E  and the total labor and 
capital endowments, 
W L  and 
W K  (thusthe total number of firms, 
W n ), are 
normalized to be one. Thus, n is North’s share of firms.
9 
 
2.2.  Initial equilibrium 
Utility maximization results in the CES demand function in the M-sector. This, 
together with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition implies “mill pricing” is optimal. 
Thus local and export prices of the product variety of a North-based M-sector firm are 
given by: 
(2) 
σ
τ
τ
σ / 1 1
,
/ 1 1
*
−
= ≡
−
=
a
p p
a
p . 
Local and export prices of the product variety of a South-based M-sector firm are 
given by: 
(3) 
σ
τ
τ
σ / 1 1
,
/ 1 1
*
*
*
*
−
= ≡
−
=
aw
p p
aw
p S S S , 
where “a” is the unit labor requirement and w
* (<1) is the South wage rate, which are 
exogenously given as a constant. North (South) consumers pay p (
*
S p ) for local 
                                                 
9 The total number of households (population) is one in the world, because each individual has one unit 
of labor and capital.The level of demand depends on population size rather than income.   8
variety and  S p  (
* p ) for imported variety. Consumption per local variety and 
imported (foreign) variety in North are respectively given by: 
(4) 
σ σ
σ
τ
µ
− −
−
+
=
1 * * 1 ) ( S p n np
s p
c  and 
σ σ
σ
τ
τ µ
− −
−
+
=
1 * * 1
*
) (
) (
S
S
S p n np
s p
c . 
Utilizing (2) (3) and (4), the profit for a representative firm in North is given 
by  
σ
σ
σ
µ τ
π
−
−
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
=
1
*
1
) (
) 1 (
) (
) ( a
n
s
n
s
n ,  
where 
σ σ τ
− − − + ≡ ∆
1 1 * ] ) )( 1 ( [ ) ( a w n n n  and 
σ σ σ τ
− − − − + ≡ ∆
1 1 * 1 * ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( a w n n n .
10 
Noting the South wage rate is w
*, the profit for a South-based firm is  
σ σ
σ
µ
τ π
− −
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
=
1 *
*
1 * ) (
] [
1
] [
) ( aw
n
s
n
s
n . 

2.3.  Long-run equilibrium(without Environmental Policy) 
In the long-run equilibrium, capital is freely mobile between countries and the 
profits are equalized between North and South. The profit equalization determines 
North firm shares, 0 n  (we let a subscript “0” denote the initial equilibrium): 
(5)  0
] [
1
) (
] [
) ) ( 1 ( ) ( ) (
0
*
1 * 1
0
1 *
0
*
0 =
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
− +
∆
− = −
− − −
n
s
w
n
s
w n n
σ σ σ τ τ
σ
µ
π π . 
Then solving (5), we can obtain the long-run equilibrium firm share,  
(6)
) )( ) ( 1 (
)] ( ) 1 ( [
1 1 * 1 *
1 * 1 1 ) 1 ( 2 1 *
0 σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
τ τ
τ τ τ
− − −
− − − − −
− −
− + −
=
w w
w s w
n .   
Noting that 1
1 * >
−σ
w  due to 
* w <1, and  1
1 <
−σ τ  due to  1 > τ , we have 
0
1 1 * > −
− − σ σ
τ w .  In the following, we mainly consider the case with  1 0 0 < < n , 
                                                 
10 Note that each firm’s profit is 1/σ times firm revenue. The (1 – 1/σ) terms cancel out in the price of a 
variety and in CES composition.   9
which holds only if  0 ) ( 1
1 * > −
−σ τw , and investigate the impact of environmental 
standards on firm location.
11 However, we also discuss the case with  0 ) ( 1
1 * < −
−σ τw  
(i.e., with a low wage rate and small trade costs) as a special case. In this special case, 
all firms concentrate in South, i.e.,  0 n =0.    
The highest trade costs below which all firms locate in South (i.e.,  0 n =0),  S τ , 
is given by 
) 1 ( 2
) 1 ( 4
) 1 ( 2 * 1 *
1
s
s s w w
S −
− − −
=
− −
−
σ σ
σ τ .
12 When  S τ τ < , all firms concentrate 
in South. We differentiate  S τ  with respect to 
* w  to obtain  0
* <
∂
∂
w
S τ
. A lower 
* w  
enhances cost advantage in South and attracts more firms to South. Hence full 
agglomeration in South is more likely. This means an increase in  S τ .  
Proposition 1: The larger the North-South wage gap (i.e., the lower the South 
wage rate), the more firms are attracted to South. Sufficiently small trade costs 
and/or a substantially low South wage rate lead all firms to concentrate in South 
(i.e., full agglomeration in South).  
 
2.4.  Negative externalities 
Negative externalities are generated locally when the M-goods are consumed. 
It is assumed that emissions never negatively affect production in both sectors but 
affect each consumer’s utility as seen in (1). The quantity consumed by the North 
(South) residents for a local variety is given by 
a w n n
s
c
] ) )( 1 ( [
1 * σ τ
µγ
− − +
=  
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− +
−
= − − σ σ σ τ
µγ
* 1 * 1
*
] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
aw w n n
s
cS  and that for an imported variety is 
σ σ τ τ
µγ
) ( ] ) )( 1 ( [
* 1 * w a w n n
s
cS − − +
=   ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− +
−
= − − σ σ σ τ τ
µγ
a w n n
s
c
] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
1 * 1
* , where 
                                                 
11  0 ) ( 1
1 * > −
−σ τw  implies that trade costs are relatively high and the South wage rate is close to 
unity. 
12 The numerator of (6) equals zero with  S τ τ = .   10
) / 1 1 ( σ γ − ≡ . It follows that the total emissions in North and South in the initial 
equilibrium are respectively: 
(7)  ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+
− +
= − + =
− σ σ τ τ
µγ
χ
) (
1
] ) )( 1 ( [
) 1 (
*
0
0 1 *
0 0
0 0 0 w
n
n
a w n n
s
c n c n S , 
(8)  ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+
− +
−
= − + =
− − σ σ σ σ τ τ
µγ
χ
*
0 0
1 *
0
1
0
*
0
*
0
*
0
1
] ) 1 ( [
) 1 (
) 1 (
w
n n
a w n n
s
c n c n S . 
We next consider the case where all firms concentrate in South (i.e.,  0 0 = n ). 
Full agglomeration in South could occur when trade costs are small enough and/or 
South wage rates are low enough: 1)  0 ) ( 1
1 * > −
−σ τw and  S τ τ < , or 2) 
0 ) ( 1
1 * < −
−σ τw . In both cases, North and South emissions are given by 
(9)
a w
s
c
a w
s
c S S *
* *
0 * 0
) 1 (
,
−
= = = =
µγ
χ
τ
µγ
χ . 
This implies that the smaller trade costs and lower South wage increase North 
emissions. The lower consumption prices in North due to the smaller trade costs and  
lower South wage rate increase North consumption and hence North emissions. 
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT 
STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
3.1.  Compliance costs 
Now the North government unilaterally introduces a product standard in terms 
of emissions during consumption. The maximum level of emissions allowed per unit 
consumption is z(<1), which is called the emission standard level. If a product meets 
the standard (that is, if a product is a “clean” product), it can be sold in the North 
market. However, if it does not (that is, if it is a “dirty” product), it cannot be sold in 
North. Thus, North firms producing dirty products stop their operation in North and 
relocate to South. South firms producing dirty products cannot export to North.  
In response to the North standard, some firms incur costs to comply with the 
standard, while the others do not. For simplicity, the number of firms complying with 
the standard (henceforth C-firms) and firms without compliance (henceforth D-firms)   11
are exogenously given as  C N  and  D N , where  1 = + D C N N .
13 We assume that firm 
types never change even if firms change location. The compliance needs additional 
labor forces per unit of production and thus the labor coefficient for C-firms, “b”, 
satisfies  a b > , while that of D-firms remains to be “a”. It follows that “b-a” can be 
interpreted as additional units of labor per output to conform to the standard.  
The standard forces D-firms out from North and all D-firms concentrate in 
South. North bans all imports of D-firm products. In other words, D-firms become 
local firms in South, which locate and sell only in South. On the other hand, since C-
firm products meet the standard, C-firms can locate in either North or South to 
maximize their own profits and can sell in both markets by incurring trade costs.  
 
3.2.  Long-run Equilibrium  
Now we investigate the long-run equilibrium under the environmental product 
standard. Capital is mobile to equalize the profits. Although all D-firms locate in 
South due to the standard, C-firms are able to choose their location which could be 
diversified between two countries. We denote the share of C-firms located in North by 
“m” ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ m ). Since all D-firms locate in South, the firm share in North under the 
standard (the subscript “1”) can be defined as  
(10) C
D C
C N m
N N
N m
n 1
1
1 =
+
≡ . 
We note that the number of C-firms is  C N m1  in North and  C N m ) 1 ( 1 − in South. The 
total number of firms in South is  C D N m N ) 1 ( 1 − +  and the total number of firms in the 
world is unity, i.e.,  1 ) 1 ( 1 1 = + = − + + D C C D C N N N m N N m .  C N  and  D N  are 
exogenously given but m is endogenously determined by  0
* = − C C π π . The profits of 
a North-based C-firm and a South-based C-firm are given by: 
(11) 
σ
µβ τ
π
σ
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
=
−
*
1 ) 1 ( s s
C , 
                                                 
13 We could assume a situation that firm types are randomly allocated with a certain probability. Or 
more precisely, we suppose that a firm draws a lottery to decide its own firm type before its operation 
as in Hopenhayn-Melitz approach. We examine the case where firm types are endogenously 
determined in Section 4.3.   12
(12) 
σ
µβ τ
π
σ σ − −
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
=
1 *
*
1
* ) 1 ( w s s
C , 
where 
σ τ β β
− − + ≡ ∆
1 *
1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( w N m N m C C , 
σ σ σ
β βτ α
− − −
− + + ≡ ∆
1 *
1
1
1
1 * * ) 1 ( w N m N m w N C C D , 
σ α
− ≡
1 a and
σ β
− ≡
1 b . Note that 
β α >  holds, because a<b.  
 Solving 
(13)  0
1 ) 1 (
*
1 1 *
*
1
* = ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
− ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
∆
−
+
∆
= −
− − − s s w s s
C C
σ σ σ τ
σ
µβ τ
σ
µβ
π π , 
 we have  
(14)        
) ]( ) ( 1 [
]} ) ( [ ] ) ( 1 [ {
1 1 * 1 *
1 * ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 1 * 1 *
1 σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
τ τ β
τ τ τ β τ α
− − −
− − − − −
− −
− + − + −
=
w w N
w s s N w sN w
m
c
C D . 
Therefore, the total number of firms in North,  1 n , is given by 
(15)    
) ]( ) ( 1 [
]} ) ( [ ] ) ( 1 [ {
1 1 * 1 *
1 * ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 1 * 1 *
1 1 σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
τ τ β
τ τ τ β τ α
− − −
− − − − −
− −
− + − + −
= =
w w
w s s N w sN w
N m n
C D
C . 
Appendix 1 shows that compared to the initial equilibrium,  1 m  is always 
greater than the North firm share in the initial equilibrium (i.e.,  1 m > 0 n ) as long as 
both  0 1 > m  and  0 0 > n  hold. Moreover, the share of available varieties in North 
increases by the standard, i.e.,  0 1 1 n N m n C > = .
15 By excluding D-firms and attracting 
more C-firms to North, North can raise the share of made-in-North varieties. Then the 
total number of producers in North is always greater with the standard. Intuitively, the 
concentration of D-firms in South and no imports of D-firm products in North reduce 
competition in North, which attracts more C-firms to North. Since prices (marginal 
costs) of C-firms are higher than those of D-firms and have less impact on the market 
                                                 
15 See Appendix 1 for proof. 
17 We have 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+
− +
= ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+
− +
= − − − σ σ σ σ σ σ τ τ
µγ
τ τ
µγ
χ
) (
) 1 (
] ) )( 1 ( [ ) (
) 1 (
) ( ) 1 (
*
1
1 *
1 1
*
1 1
1 *
1
1
1
1 w
m
m
b w m m
s z
b w
N m
b
N m
b w N m b N m
s z C C
C C
. 
Hence, 1 χ  is independent of  C N .   13
competition in North, more C-firms can locate in North. Therefore, standards could 
increase the North firm share.   
Proposition 2: Unless all firms concentrate in South, an environmental 
product standard introduced in North attracts more C-firms to North by 
forcing D-firms to move to South. The standard increases the total number 
of firms in North. 
The total emissions in each country are given by 
(16) ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1 CS C C C c N m c N m z − + = χ , 
(17)
* *
1
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1
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The North consumption of a local variety (C-firms) is given by  σ
µγ
b
s
cC ∆
=  and that of 
an imported variety is  σ τ
µγ
) (
* bw
s
cCS ∆
= . The South consumption of a local C-firm 
variety is given by  σ
µγ
) (
) 1 (
* *
*
bw
s
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−
= , that of an imported variety is  σ τ
µγ
) (
) 1 (
*
*
b
s
cC ∆
−
= , 
and that of a D-firm variety is  σ
µγ
) (
) 1 (
* *
*
aw
s
cDS ∆
−
= .   
 
3.3.  Policy impact on North emissions  
We compare North emissions with and without emission standards. Total emissions 
without the standard are given by (7) and those with the standard are given by 
(18) ⎟ ⎟
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where  1 χ  is independent of  C N .
17  
Appendix 2 proves that  0 1 χ χ >  if  b a ≅  and  1 ≅ z  hold, or more precisely 
b z a / / 1 ≅  holds. In other words, when compliance costs are very small (b is close to 
a) and the emission standard level is fairly lax (z is close to unity), then the standard   14
raises North emissions,  0 1 χ χ > .
19 Intuitively, the standard increases the made-in-
North varieties. Since made-in-North varieties do not involve trade cost payment, 
consumption and hence emissions expand in North.
20 
Turning to the special case in which full agglomeration arises in South (i.e., 
0 2 = n  and  0 2 = m , where a subscript “2” denotes the full agglomeration in South), 
the emissions are always less under the standard than in the initial equilibrium, 
2 0 χ χ > , drawing a comparison between (9) and 
* 2 w b
s z
τ
µγ
χ = . As long as all firms 
agglomerate in South, the North standards perfectly work and can effectively reduce 
emissions.  
Proposition 3: Unless all firms concentrate in South, North environmental 
product standards could worsen North environment. This is more likely 
when compliance costs are low and standards are lax. If all firms 
concentrate in South, on the other hand, North product standards 
necessarily improve environment in North.   
 
3.4.  Why do the North environmental standards increase emissions? 
Location effect and import embargo effect  
The reasons why emissions increase by an environmental product standard are 
as follows. First, North enforces the regulations and all available varieties in North are 
only C-firm products, which charge higher prices than in the initial equilibrium due to 
the compliance costs. As a result, the North market potential increases through less 
competition (a fall of ∆). On the other hand, all D-firms locate in South, which charge 
lower prices. The South market potential decreases through tougher market 
competition (a rise of ∆*). North can attract more C-firms by the standard. Since 
domestic varieties of C-firms increase, North consumers pay less trade costs and can 
consume more. Thus, North emissions increase. This stems from an increase in the 
number of C-firms in North, which is called the “location” effect.    
                                                 
19 North standards could decrease South emissions. See Section 4.1.  
20 Recall that our basic model assumes that both South wage rate and trade costs are relatively high (i.e., 
0 ) ( 1
1 * > −
−σ τw ). The impact of trade costs is more dominant than that of lower wage in South. Thus, 
import prices from South are still higher than made-in-North prices in North.   15
Second, the total number of consumed varieties in North declines because of 
the ban on D-firm products. When the number of available varieties decreases, the 
consumption of each variety increases, which dominates the decrease in the available 
varieties in the CES function. As a result, more emissions are generated. This is called 
the “import embargo” effect. This effect is promoted by smaller σ (more substitution 
between varieties).    
These two effects increase emissions. As the South wage rate or the trade costs 
fall, more C-firms are attracted to South, which reduces the location effect and 
decreases emissions. An increase in the number of C-firms, C N , reduces the import 
embargo effect and can mitigate emissions (see Section 4.2).  
4. EXTENSIONS 
This section considers some extensions of our basic model to understand the impacts 
of environmental product standards more generally. 
4.1.  Global Emissions 
In this subsection, we discuss the case of transboundary emissions. Our model 
framework is kept as in Section 3 except that emissions are transboundary. For 
simplicity, we focus on the case where emissions are completely transboundary and 
hence the environment deterioration depends on the global emissions which are 
defined as aggregate of both countries’ emissions: 
*
1 1 1 χ χ χ + ≡
W , where North 
emissions are given by (18) and South emissions are given by 
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Suppose  b z a / / 1 ≅ . Standards always increase North emissions and always 
decrease South emissions,  0 1 0 < − χ χ  and  0
*
1
*
0 > − χ χ  (see Appendixes 2 and 3). 
Thus, the effect on global emissions is generally ambiguous. Global emissions depend 
on firm share, m, which is determined by the number of C-firms, C N  and population   16
share, s. For instance, higher share of C-firms in North, m, increases  1 χ  but decreases 
*
1 χ , and could increase 
W
1 χ  and vice versa.  
Turning from general case to the special case where all firms concentrate in South. 
The emissions with (“2”) and without (“0”) standards are given by 
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Since 
b
z
a
>
1
, we always have 
W W
2 0 χ χ > . Thus, emission standards can always reduce 
the global emissions. 
Proposition 4: When compliance costs are sufficiently low and emission 
standards are sufficiently lax, the emissions increase in North but decrease in 
South. The effect on the global emissions is generally ambiguous unless all firms 
locate in South.  
4.2.  C- and D-firm ratio    
The environmental product standard generates two types of firms. C-firms 
incur compliance costs, while D-firms do not.  The total numbers of C-firms and D-
firms are exogenously given and m is endogenously determined through location 
choice by C-firms. This subsection investigates the exogenous changes in  C N  by 
keeping the total number of firms in the world constant, i.e.  1 = + D C N N .  
When  C N  is positive but is not very large, all C-firms prefer to locate in North 
which has the larger market. In the range where  C N  is greater than  C N
~
, as  C N  rises, 
the share of the North firms  1 m  decreases, because some C-firms choose to locate in 
South,  0
1 <
C dN
dm
.
22 The threshold value,  C N
~
, is derived by setting  0 1 = m  in (14):  
                                                 
22 Appendix 1 shows 
0
1 <
C dN
dm  when  1 1 < m .   17
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At extreme when almost all firms are C-firms with a moderate wage gap and trade 
costs, their locations are diversified between North and South.  
We now investigate North emissions with (“1”) and without (“0”) standard 
when  C N  increases. North emissions in the initial equilibrium are independent of  C N  
as shown in (7). Under the standard, North firms are diversified (i.e., 0< 1 m  <1) when 
C C N N
~
>  and hence emissions,  1 χ , are dependent on  C N , or,  1 m . Utilizing (18) and 
noting   1
* > τ w , we obtain 
(21) 0
) ( ] ) )( 1 ( [
) 1 (
2 1
1 1 1
1 >
− +
−
=
− σ σ τ τ
τ µγ χ
w b w m m
w s z
dm
d
. 
Thus, an increase in  C N  decreases  1 m  as well as 1 χ . If  C N  is large, the emissions are 
more likely to be less than those without standards.  
If the number of C-firms is large enough, i.e., 
S
C C N N ≥ , where  
] ) ( ) 1 [( ] ) ( 1 [
] ) ( 1 [
1 * ) 1 ( 2 1 *
1 *
σ σ σ
σ
τ τ β τ α
τ α
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≡
w s s w s
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S
C , 
then all firms concentrate in South, i.e., m=0. As we have discussed as a special case 
in the last section, emissions are always less than the initial ones,  0 2 χ χ < .   
Proposition 5: As the proportion of C-firms increases, the C-firm locations are 
more likely to be diversified (i.e., m falls) and North environmental destruction 
led by standards can be mitigated. 
4.3.  Endogenous Firm Type 
While our basic model exogenously gives the total numbers of C-firm and D-
firm, we now relax this assumption. C N  and  D N are now endogenously determined so 
as to equalize both types’ profits. It should be noted that no entry and exit is still 
assumed in the model and hence the total number of firms is always unity 
(1 = + D C N N ). Each firm chooses its type but each type has both cost and benefit. D-
firms have lower marginal costs, a, but are required to locate in South, the smaller 
market, and cannot export to North under environmental product standards. C-firms   18
involve higher marginal costs, b, but can freely choose location and export to the 
foreign country.  
In the long-run equilibrium,  C N  and m are determined so as to satisfy location 
condition for C-firms  0
* = − C C π π as well as firm type condition,  0
* * = − D C π π . Two 
conditions are given by 
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In general, however, both conditions are not simultaneously binding in the 
equilibrium.
23 There are only four possibilities: 1) 0
* > − C C π π  and  0
* * = − D C π π  and 
2)  0
* = − C C π π and  0
* * < − D C π π , 3)  0
* < − C C π π  and  0
* * = − D C π π  and 4) 
0
* = − C C π π 0
* * > − D C π π . The equilibrium in each case is as follows: 
1) All firms are C-firms and locate in North (m=1 and  1 = C N ).  
2) All firms are D-firms and locate in South ( 1 = D N ). 
3) All firms locate in South (mixed types). ( 1 0 < < C N and  m=0) 
4) All firms are C-firms and locate in North and South ( 1 = C N and  0<m<1).  
Whereas 1) and 2) occur if 
σ σ
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 (see Appendix 4). 
Case 1: North emissions are written as 
b
s zµγ
χ = 3 . Thus, North emissions under 
standards may or may not be less than the initial emission level. In this case, North 
may worsen environment. With smaller b (smaller compliance costs) and/or larger z 
                                                 
23 See Appendix 4 for proof.   19
(lax environmental regulations), North emissions are more likely to exceed the initial 
emission level. 
Case 2: Since all firms are D-firms, they cannot export to North. North cannot 
consume M-goods and thus generate no emissions. No consumption in North leads to 
welfare loss. This can be regarded as a kind of market failure. 
Case 3: Only the type condition is binding and determines  C N .
24 Solving the type 
condition, we obtain 
β α
α
−
=
s
NC . North emissions can be written as
* 4 w b
s z
τ
µγ
χ = . 
Obviously this is always less than the initial level.
25 
Case 4: The firm share in the long-run equilibrium can be solved as 
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Note that firm share is the same as the initial equilibrium,  6 0 n n = . North emissions 
are written as  
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which is less than the initial emission level, 0 χ . 
Proposition 6: Suppose that firms can freely choose either C- or D-firm under 
environment product standards. Then, in a range of parameterizations, all firms 
become C-firms and locate in North. In this case, North environment 
deteriorates if the compliance costs are sufficiently low and the environmental 
product standard is sufficiently lax. 
  
                                                 
24 We have 
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25 In this case, all firms locate in South in the initial equilibrium.    20
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have explored the effects of environmental product standards on 
environment in a North-South trade model with firm relocation. Specifically, we have 
examined a case where North unilaterally introduces a product standard under which 
dirty products (i.e., products not meeting the standard) are not allowed to be sold in 
the North market. Our model has uncovered a possibility that such environmental 
product standards worsen North environment and improve South environment. In 
particular, we have found that small compliance costs and lax emission standards tend 
to generate such a paradoxical result. It is expected that the laxer the environmental 
standard is, the smaller the costs to comply with the standard. Thus, no environmental 
standard is likely to be better than a lax standard from the viewpoint of environmental 
protection in North. Even if environmental damage is not local but global, North 
environmental product standards could worsen global environment.  
Our model is on the basis of monopolistic competition. We do not claim that 
monopolistic competition is the best market structure to investigate the issue. Our 
focus is on the effects of environmental product standards on environment through 
firm location choices. Firm location choices have extensively been studied in the 
NEG framework which heavily depends on monopolistic competition. Thus, it seems 
like the natural starting point to build a monopolistically competitive model based on 
the NEG framework to analyze how firm location choices led by environmental 
standards affect environment. However, it is certainly worthwhile to examine the 
same issue in alternative market structures.  
Furthermore, we can extend our model in many ways to analyze various 
situations in the real world. A possible extension of our model is to consider type 
switch involving environmental R&D activities. Firms may invest in R&D to comply 
with standards. Also, it would be possible to incorporate entry and exit into the model. 
For example, D-firms may choose exit rather than relocation. However, the model 
would become much more complex and may not provide analytical solutions. In this 
case, we need to rely on numerical simulations.  
Environmental product standards in our model are very stringent in the sense 
that those firms that do not conform to the standards relocate to foreign countries. 
However, governments may be more generous and permissive. In the real world   21
governments tend to subsidize firms so that products meet standards. However, our 
model does not capture this issue. To study the policy in this viewpoint, we may have 
to use incentive theory with asymmetric information.  
 
APPENDIX 1: FIRM SHARE 
We prove  0 1 n m >  and  0 1 n n > .  
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APPENDIX 2: EMISSIONS 
We show that  0 1 χ χ >  if  b z a / / 1 ≅  holds. 
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Noting  0 1 n m >  (see Appendix 1), and  1 ) (
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σ τ w  and  1 ) (
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−σ τ w  due to 1
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we have the following relationships: 
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Thus, 0 1 0 < − χ χ  holds. 
APPENDIX 3: SOUTH EMISSIONS 
We first derive South emissions when  b a ≈  and  1 ≈ z .We have 
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Now we define the following function Ω in terms of a variable, x: 
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conclude that as  1 n (namely, 1 m ) rises by more stringent North standards, South 
emissions fall.  
APPENDIX 4: ENDOGENOUS FIRM TYPE 
We prove that both type and location conditions are not binding 
simultaneously in the case of endogenous firm types. Two conditions can be re-
written as   23
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If both conditions are binding simultaneously, then the following must hold: 
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where ∆ and ∆* are functions of the number of firms, and hence the values are 
endogenously determined. By contrast, since marginal costs, a and b, wage rate, 
* w  
and trade costs, τ, are exogenously given, 
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w  does not generally 
hold. In general, therefore, location and firm type conditions are not binding 
simultaneously.  
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